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Most social sciences scholarship on the relationship between environmental issues and forced 
displacement on poor communities in Latin America, and particularly in Peru, explores the risk 
recognized as evident by all involved actors; however, in this study, it is the state that is producing 
a perception of risk by attempting to forcibly displace the residents of a community adjacent to the 
Belen river in the Peruvian Amazon. This research focuses on the perceptions of the residents, ex-
residents and the institutions involved in the process of displacement. Thus, the central themes of 
this thesis seek to answer the following questions: how poor people respond to government 
initiatives of displacement and relocation based on their local knowledge of risk assessment? How 
they perceive risk? What are their subjective and material worldviews of space? And how 
they understand their decision to either stay or leave Bajo Belen? This study demonstrates that the 
government’s risk assessment policies resulted from the reorganization and simplification of 
nature by the Peruvian government to suit developers’ and public and private institutions’ goals, 
instead of leveraging on the local know-how as the basis for the design of public policies. 
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Beleninos River Communities Standpoint 
 
The vocabulary used to organize nature typically betrays the overriding interests of its 
human users. In fact, utilitarian discourse replaces the term "nature" with the term 
"natural resources," focusing on those aspects of nature that can be appropriated for 
human use. 
James C. Scott. 1998. Seeing Like a State. p. 13 
 
 
Most social sciences scholarship on environmental issues and their relationship to forced 
displacement on poor communities in Latin America, and particularly in Peru, focuses on 
extractive industries, mining activity, and political violence.  These studies focus on examining 
the case of rural and Amazonian areas these studies explore the evident risk recognized by all 
involved actors. In this thesis, I inspect the case of the communities adjacent to the Belen river. In 
these communities, it is the state that is producing risk by attempting to forcibly displace the 
residents. 
 
Beleninos river communities organize their daily life around river variations, and their 
ideas of safety are based on principles of morality and solidarity, including their relationship with 
the Amazon and their identity as a river community. Belen is a district located on the riverside of 
the Itaya River, at the east and the northeast of the city of Iquitos, in the province of Maynas, in 
the region of Loreto [Insert figure 1]. Belen is one of the four districts of the city of Iquitos. It has 
 
2 
a surface area of 119.998.18 square kilometers (Kanatari, 2015) and is divided into an urban area 
and a rural area. It also has an upper area, Alto Belen, and a lower area, Bajo Belen, with important 
economic, social, and mostly cultural differences.  
 
Beleninos live in stilt houses with wood or concrete pillars and stories used depending on 
the season. The houses have wood and palm frond roofs, which result in a woody almost moldy 
smell when mixed with hot air. While rustic, these households usually have light and water 
systems. For many months of the year, the neighborhoods are organized with wood board bridges 
functioning as aerial sidewalks [Insert figures 2-6]. Canoes transit under the houses, children play 
in the polluted water, and turkey buzzards fly in circles overhead. The waste in the water includes 
syringes from the medical center and fecal matter as a result of the many drains that flow into the 
Itaya River. Absent an epidemiological study, the degree of to which this contamination impacts 
on the health of inhabitants is unknown. 
 
The city of Iquitos is isolated because of the absence of road infrastructure to connect it 
with the rest of Peru. It is an exclusively fluvial city, which means that the only way to get there 
is by plane or river. The main features of this city are the fast-flowing rivers of the Amazon basin, 
tropical humid weather, and poor soil for agriculture and livestock. Indeed, the interaction between 
the weather and the soil contributes to movement towards the rivers; consequently, the territory 
appears unstable (Vega-Centeno, 2007). Rainfall also shapes the social and urban development of 
Belen. For example, during the rainy season, the Beleninos add stories to their houses to prevent 
flooding. While the dry season or “bajial” between July and August is characterized by less 
precipitation (200ml/m2), during the “tahuampa” between January and March, the rainfall can 
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exceed 1000ml/m2, varying the level of the rivers by 25 meters and flooding the riverbanks for 
hundreds of kilometers (Vega-Centeno, 2007). The variance in rainfall creates a diversity of 
geographic spaces and the regenerative cycle of the Amazon for the flora and fauna. As Iquitos is 
essentially in a riverbed, it is a movable territory or floating city that has incorporated flexible 
urban-architectural systems including residential complexes, commercial areas, and places of 
leisure. These systems can change their physical configurations to adapt to the variations in the 
river levels and flooding. 
 
Belen has 68,806 inhabitants (INEI, 2007) distributed over 56 caseríos [small villages] and 
19 neighborhoods in the urban area. It is important to  note that the main means of transportation 
that inhabitants use are peque peques [canoes] and motocars [motorcycles with extra seats in the 
back] [Insert figures 7-10]. The port of Belen is the principal trade source and it has the highest 
rate of criminality in the whole district. In general, Belen is the most extreme example of Loreto’s 
poor standing as a region in terms of health, education, and violence (ENDES, 2012). 
 
It is not possible to determine the precise origin of Belen; however, cartography in the 
Amazonian Library in Iquitos identifies Belen at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1890, health 
reports of Iquitos make reference to the “neighborhood of Belen” as well as the concept of 
“societies of the water” and “people of the river” (Villarejo, 1988; Larrabure y Correa, 1905-09). 





In 2014, the government of Peru declared the river communities of Belen in a state of 
emergency and in need of relocation because of the constant inundation by the Itaya River. In the 
law that supports the resettlement project, the Peruvian government proposes ideas about risk that 
delegitimize the Beleninos worldview. This study, draws upon scholarship on the manufacturing 
on housing insecurity and on the constitutive role of subaltern struggles in transforming space, to 
show that this state-led displacement is in fact producing  danger among residents of Belen.  
 
The first set of literature focuses on housing insecurity and risk of eviction in poor 
communities. These studies show how US housing policy has seen a shift from affordable housing 
for public good to for-profit affordable housing. There are also cases of private interests shaping 
the implementation of state housing regulations intended to protect residents (Sullivan & Ward, 
2012; Sullivan, 2016a, b, c; Olmedo & Ward, 2016; Ward & Peters, 2007; Desmond, 2014, 2013, 
2012; Hartman & Robinson, 2003). These authors focus on poverty, spatial inequality, and 
housing, with special interest in both forced and voluntary residential mobility. What is clear is 
that housing has profound impacts on health, income, education, and social stability, and yet the 
US is crippled by an affordable housing crisis. The second set of literature concentrates on how 
residents excluded from formal channels of political participation create their own informal 
organizations and engage in sustained direct action to shape urban change. These studies show 
how what appears as adequate policy from the government’s perspective can exacerbate social 
isolation, perpetuate squatting, and aggravate unemployment, transport costs, and interpersonal 
violence (Levenson, 2017a, 2017b; Auyero, 2012, 2000; Ferguson, 2015, 2007; Chatterjee, 2011, 
2004; Huchzermeyer, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2011; Makhulu, 2015; Yiftachel, 2009a, 2009b; Strauss 
& Liebenberg, 2014; Lemanski, 2011, 2009, 2007; Lemanski & Oldfield, 2009). These authors 
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discuss how the consolidation of a representative political organization can make demands more 
effective while in cases where factionalism prevails, the government imposes its policies. Thus, 
understanding urban change requires thinking about political processes from above and from 
below as  profoundly intertwined. 
 
The story of Sergio that follows outlines the central themes of this thesis: how poor people 
respond to government initiatives of displacement and relocation based on their local knowledge 
of risk assessment, how they perceive risk, their subjective and material worldviews of space, and 





Sergio. June 2, 2017 
 
It’s 4pm and the heat is overwhelming. The humidity is almost 100% and I can feel the 
sweat building all over my body. The air is hot enough to warm my nostrils, but it is not as bad as 
it is during midday when the heat makes conducting regular activities almost impossible. Usually 
people prefer not to talk to me about the resettlement project that the Peruvian government has 
been trying to implement since 2014, which seeks to relocate inhabitants of Bajo Belen to a distant 
area. However, at this time people, are usually finishing their work day if they work in commerce, 
as the vast majority of people in Bajo Belen do.  
 
Sergio moved to Bajo Belen when he was 21 years old, after leaving the chacra [farm] to 
finish high school. He is now 76, and lives with his wife, his two daughters and his son-in-law. He 
has a spacious wood stilt house with two levels  [Insert figure 11]. They are currently using the 
second level because of the higher precipitation. His house is divided into two big areas. The 
sleeping area has two bedrooms and the common area includes the kitchen and the dining room. 
While walking me through the organization of his house, Sergio is telling me how proud he is of it 
because he did it all by himself and is able to provide shelter for his family. He ruminates about 
the time when he arrived to Belen, when the space was almost empty, and he tells me how he 
started to organize with other neighbors to build a community. Sergio likes Belen; that is what he 
keeps telling me during conversations, even though he recognizes that there are problems of citizen 




He has two jobs: during summer, he works in agriculture, while during the period of higher 
rainfall, he works as a fisherman. He is proud of his jobs because they have allowed him and his 
wife to raise their children. He believes that living in Belen allows him to survive because there is 
always something to work on. When we talk about the resettlement project, he passionately asks 
me, “How am I going to survive in Varillalito? You cannot harvest that land. You cannot fish. How 
am I going to live in a house that looks like a tiny drawer? That house is for a couple, not for a 
family. Here we can have a concrete house.” Varillalito is the resettlement area, a distant place 
at kilometer 12.6 of the Iquitos-Nauta Highway [Insert figure 12]. Varillalito is one to two hours 
away by bus, and the round trip costs 4 soles [1.25 dollars], which is a large amount of money for 
the average Beleninx, who makes around 20 soles per day and travels with at least two children. 
 
Now Sergio stands up from his chair and shows me his outboard motors for the boat, 
“Where am I going to keep my motors, and all my material for work? How much I am going to 
pay for someone to keep it for me, just to be able to go fishing?” He says that many people in 
Varillalito want to come back, but the Beleninos and their authorities have an agreement about 
not letting any “traitor” return. “They have betrayed their people, like a soldier can betray his 
homeland.” With a mischievous look, he tells me that he knows four neighbors who went to the 
resettlement area but now want to come back because they say that there are no work 
opportunities, and they do not like the atmosphere. Now his face becomes excited as he exclaims 
that in Belen, people grab their canoes and go to the market, and they can eat with 10 soles [3.15 
dollars]. He says that in Varillalito, the houses have no iron support: “Imagine with the rainfall! 
Those houses are going to cave in. They are built with sand, not with earth; those house are going 




Sergio is convinced that the authorities of Iquitos want them out of Bajo Belen because 
they want to use the space for business, particularly for tourism. That is why the Beleninos held 
many protests. “People in the government say that this place is uninhabitable because of the 
flooding, and that it is not possible to build concrete structures, but here we have houses, churches, 
and high schools built with it.” I remember the protests; there were actually at least two per year 
since 2014. He says that there are some communities that do get flooded, but not theirs. They have 
a plan when the precipitation changes. “They [the government] do not know the geography like 
us.” Sergio claims that the government tries to buy the decision-making of Beleninos about the 
resettlement project, but that, in his perspective, everything is a huge lie to take advantage of their 
space in Bajo Belen.  
 
“One day, the head of the MVCS1 came and we all took out our whistles and started to 
make noise. All the neighbors went outside their houses and we saw that the MVCS wanted to have 
a meeting to advertise Varillalito. We closed off their path, and we prevented the meeting. The 
police came and told them that it was better not to come unannounced, that Beleninos have an 
internal law, and that they need to talk with the community leader in advance.” Sergio’s wife, 
Rosa, intervenes and says that Beleninos are very peaceful, that they can handle it, but they have 
their limits, and that the people will rise up because Belen is their home. By this time, Sergio is 
trying to hide his already weepy eyes. He explains to me that Bajo Belen is a land that was born 
in nature. “I serve this town; it is painful to see people leave. I will fight until death. I owe it to 
this town, and they owe me as well. I will fight for my people and I will only leave this place if I 
                                                
1 Ministry of Housing, Construction, and Sanitation 
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am dead. There are laws here that we can use to defend ourselves, I have studied those. I sowed 
here and I am here until now; all my kids grew up here. I will defend myself and all the people 
who want to fight for this town.” With tears in his eyes, he looks at their surroundings.  
 
The government’s understanding of risk differs from that of most Beleninos, like Sergio 
and his wife. The Peruvian government argues that the households settled in Bajo Belen2 are at 
high risk because of the flooding of the Itaya River caused by the variations in rainfall. Therefore, 
in November 2014, the government of Peru enacted a law declaring the emergency resettlement 
of the communities of Bajo Belen. According to law Nº30291 (El Peruano, 2014) the constant 
flooding makes Bajo Belen nearly uninhabitable. Thus, in 2015, the Ministry of Housing, 
Construction, and Sanitation (MVCS) financed the first project of resettlement to give the 
inhabitants of Belen safer living conditions with potable water, sewage systems, electricity, and 
resources, such as a medical center, market, parks, police station, elementary schools, and high 
schools. 
 
After presenting the local and cultural context of Bajo Belen, and where this study is 
situated in a broader spectrum of literature and research themes, this thesis is organized into two 
main sections. The first presents the fieldwork process, the methods used along with their benefits 
and limitations. The second section, based on ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews, 
analyzes a map of the three main groups’ responses to the resettlement project, and the crucial role 
of the government in framing risk to justify forced displacement and relocation.   
                                                
2 Bajo Belen is organized into 8 areas: Santa Rosa, 4 de Octubre, Sachachorro, Belén III etapa, Bajo Belén, 30 de 
Agosto, Pueblo Libre, and Nuevo Liberal. 
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The “getting down” Ethnography and Language 
 This study is based on 54 formal in-depth interviews distributed between inhabitants of 
Belen (22), ex-inhabitants of Belen that now live in the resettlement area (13), public servants of 
institutions related to the resettlement project (16), and scholars from Iquitos that follow the project 
(3). In addition, I carried out countless informal conversations and ethnographic fieldwork over a 
10-month period; distributed over October of 2014; February, March, and December of 2015; 
April, June, and December of 2016; and May, June, and July of 2017. In addition to archival work 
mostly in Iquitos, I conducted all the formal interviews in this last period in 2017.  Most of the in-
depth interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and coded to analyze their content. The 
interviews not tape-recorded were codified by using the notes taken during the interview. 
 
I was constantly seeking immersion3 within the community to see how the people lead their 
lives. I believe that I truly committed myself both physically and mentally to penetrating and 
experiencing their situation (Emerson, 2003), and to “inscribing” their social discourse; writing 
down the situations and events of their everyday lives. I turned passing events into written 
interpretations for future reference (Geertz, 1973). However, it was important for me to recognize 
the fluidity of “outsiderness”/“insiderness” as a methodological aspect. Ethnographers are never 
fully outside or inside the community studied. My relationship with the community was never 
                                                
3 It is not possible to have total immersion. There will always be moments that will remind a researcher of their 
limitations. This is what Jooyoung Lee (2016) recalls when he talks about ethnography and the process of showing 
that he was “down” instead of getting totally “in”[mersed]. 
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expressed in explicit terms but constantly being negotiated and renegotiated in everyday 
interactions (Naples, 1996).  
 
I recall my first day in Belen when I was getting to know the Beleninos and I was called 
“señorita” [Miss] as I was seen as the girl researching their community. After spending some 
months with them I became “Sharito” [little Sharon]; however, there was always an ongoing shift 
between my two denominations. The experience of ‘hanging out’ in Belen was indispensable to 
my research. The familiarity and bonding created by my participation in the everyday lives of the 
inhabitants of Belen and ex-Beleninos, focusing on the “activities of people in face-to-face 
relations” (Rock, 2001: 26. In: Emerson, 2007), allowed me to “get close” in a minimally intrusive 
way to observe and understand their lives [Insert figure 13]. From washing clothes to taking baths 
to washing dishes, I saw diverse variations of the same daily activities that occur in all households. 
I experienced firsthand how these activities are intrinsically related to the rainfall, and the 
Beleninos explained to me that from their perspective, the higher the precipitation and river level, 
the more usable the water is because the garbage sinks to the bottom of the river.  
 
 My fieldwork was restricted to Bajo Belen, the communities next to the port and the market, 
which are the only ones included in the resettlement project. The Beleninos and ex-Beleninos that 
shared their lives with me are all of low socioeconomic status, with no formal education (or only 
primary education), and native Spanish speakers. They categorize themselves in relation to their 
geographical area; for instance, “Beleninos” are from Belen, and “Sanjuaninos” are from San Juan, 
the district of the resettlement area. On the other hand, the public servants and scholars from Iquitos 
had a variety of socioeconomic statuses from lower to middle, with formal education resulting in 
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technical or college degrees. They too categorized themselves in relation to their geographical 
area. All interviews were conducted in Spanish after explaining to the participants the purpose of 
the study and a verbal confidentiality agreement which includes not using real names in order to 
protect their identities. In this scenario, verbal consent is more culturally appropriate than written 
informed consent. Prior research conducted with human subjects in developing countries, 
including Peru, indicates that research participants are often wary of signing documents such as 
consent forms, and it is generally more customary to receive verbal consent for research in 
developing countries.4 
 
Conducting interviews and informal conversations in Spanish with Iquiteño slang made me 
question how to translate the true meaning of Iquiteños’ testimonies for this thesis. I started 
thinking about some differences between English and Spanish and how, as a native Spanish 
speaker, I was going to convey the emotions and significance behind each conversation. First, in 
English, each phrase needs a subject, whereas in Spanish, the verb is conjugated, so the subject is 
clear without mention. Second, in English the adjective goes always before the noun and it is 
singular and gender neutral, which never happens in Spanish. Third, in English, verbal tenses are 
used differently5, which makes literal translations challenging. Fourth, the accuracy and meaning 
of a sentence in English does not depend on one word but several and how they work together. 
                                                
4 Creed-Kanashiro, H., Oré, B., Scurrah, M., Gil, A., & Penny, M. (2005). Conducting Research in Developing 
Countries: Experiences of the Informed Consent Process from Community Studies in Peru. The Journal of Nutrition, 
135(4), 925–928. 
5 For instance, the question “cómo se pasa?” in Spanish from Iquitos could be tanslated as “How is it pass?” Which 
have nothing to do with the meaning of the question, that means "how things are done." 
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Sentences in Spanish are more flexible because each word within a sentence has a complete, non-
ambiguous meaning; for that reason, it is possible to move the words within a phrasal structure 
around without changing the meaning of the sentence. 
 
I decided to articulate literal and interpretive translations to preserve the essence of the 
dialogue while still making it understandable for English readers. That articulation appreciates that 
the reader understand both Spanish and English. The quotes do not have perfect English grammar 
nor would it be possible to translate them from this English version to perfect Spanish. The results 

















Seeing and Looking at Belen Like the State  
According to enacted law Nº30291, the lower zone of Belen, Bajo Belen, is in a state of 
emergency because of constant inundation by the Itaya River, which makes it nearly uninhabitable. 
Even before this formal legislation, there was a movement for the resettlement of Belen, beginning 
in 1953 when former president of Peru, Manuel Odría, ordered a project to move families out of 
Belen. There were no more efforts until the recent law was passed. In 2015, The Ministry of 
Housing, Construction, and Sanitation (MVCS) financed the first resettlement project to move 
people from one of the communities of Belen to an area near the Iquitos-Nauta highway in order 
to give the inhabitants of Belen a safer lifestyle. This project has the support of an 
intergovernmental working paper signed by authorities of Iquitos and Lima, including the Mayor 
of Belen (April 30, 2015). The main argument for the project is a study conducted by the Navy 
that predicts that the Amazon River will flood Bajo Belen. This study calculates the rate at which 
the Amazon River will take over the Itaya River, following what used to be its path in the 1700s, 
thereby flooding Lower Belen (Navy technical report, 2015). Therefore, the state wants to relocate 
Bajo Belen for three reasons: flooding, pollution, and overcrowding.  
 
Taking heed of James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State (1998), and Steven Pierce’s  “Looking 
Like a State” (2006), in this study I critically translate their insights on public policy to the case of 
Bajo Belen. 
 
On the one hand, in Seeing like a State, James C. Scott asks why well-intentioned plans for 
improving the human condition go tragically awry. By analyzing failed cases of large-scale 
authoritarian plans in a variety of fields, he provides a convincing account of state logic being the 
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failure of some social policies in the twentieth century. Scott argues that the success of public 
policy designs depends on the recognition of local and practical knowledge as being just as 
important as formal, epistemic knowledge. On the other hand, Steven Pierce in “Looking Like a 
State,” analyzes how the history of Nigerian corruption is also a history of Nigerian state formation 
due to western-ethnocentric and ahistorical attempts to shoehorn African policies into 
developmentalist western categories. Pierce argues that this problem emerges from the processes 
through which government institutions and actors have come to be called “state agents,” which 
envision the state as an entity constituted by legitimate actors. Both approaches to development 
policies dialogue in how the state always ignores essential features of any real, functioning social 
order. This case examines the role undertaken by the Peruvian government by declaring Bajo Belen 
in a state of emergency, which contradicts the Belenino worldview. 
 
In what follows, I describe the perceptions of the three main groups related to the social 
process of the resettlement project: public servants of institutions involved in the project, ex-
Beleninos who have ‘benefited’ from the project, and Beleninos who are the main opposition. 
Even though the government argues for resettlement due to flooding, public servants have a 
broader spectrum of ideas regarding the resettlement project that goes beyond the enacted law. Ex-
Beleninos go from praising their new space to remembering Bajo Belen with nostalgia. Finally, 
Beleninos’ perceptions range from a strong conviction to defend Bajo Belen which also provides 







Despite the diverse institutions and offices related to the resettlement project, public 
servants can be clearly delineated as those that support the project and those that do not. Some 
civil servants consider Bajo Belen uninhabitable because of the local customs, hygiene 
deficiencies, insecurity, and flooding risk. They often downplay the flooding, supposedly the core 
reason for the resettlement project, and focus on Beleninos’ everyday habits which are considered 
immoral and dirty. The government undervalues the Bajo Belen inhabitants’ decision to stay and 
delegitimize civil servants that refuse the project. For the civil servants that support the 
resettlement project, the comparison between Bajo Belen and Varillalito is radical. To them, the 
inhabitants of Bajo Belen demonstrate ignorance by refusing to move out. They argue that by 
opposing the project, Beleninos aim to preserve and benefit from immoral practices such as 
robbery, drug dealing, alcohol sales, human trafficking, and informal businesses. In addition, these 
employees question the Beleninos’ worldview because by living around and with the river, they 
willingly accept the risks of diseases from water pollution and subpar standards of living. 
Consequently, this group has a positive perspective of Varillalito and believes that this space 
represents cleanliness, safety, health, and modernity.  
 
Three major themes run through civil servants’ disagreements on the resettlement project. 
The first is water and the concept of flooding in the Amazon. Public servants against the Beleninos’ 
displacement focus on the resettlement project’s central argument: flooding and the inadequate 
living conditions of Varillalito. This group considers that the concept of flooding misinterprets the 
natural river fluctuations. For this group, the Amazon environment naturally cohabitates with 
water, which organizes the Belenino conception of space around and in water. Thus, the 
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resettlement project does not consider the local context of Iquitos, as these two public servants 
suggest: 
 
“Three-quarters of the Amazon floods, you would have to convert three-quarters of 
the Amazon into relocation, (...) It is a business... they want to make a tourist 
boulevard here” (Public Servant, 7). 
 
“The flooding is a mentality that comes from the outside; here, what we have is the 
creciente and vaciante [the higher and the lower levels of the river] (...) There is a 
whole focus on sustainability… on climate change, and they try to see how to do 
risk management; they talk about floods and huaycos [mudslides/landslides], I 
cannot understand, here there is no flooding (...) In politics, resettlement is easier 
for them, the last thing in risk management policy is resettlement” (Public Servant, 
5). 
 
This group also acknowledges Varillalito’s deficiency in basic living conditions, 
highlighting the lack of potable water and its poor quality. Varillalito has a water treatment plant 
that is supposed to distribute potable water to the 197 already installed houses. However, the water 
distribution works for less than a fourth of the total. Nevertheless, the water quality naturally 
contains higher amounts of iron, which makes it untreatable unless using a considerable amount 
of chlorine. Varillalito´s lacking living conditions also provide some insights into Belenino cultural 
practices, which have been shaped by their use of river and rainwater. Consequently, ex-Beleninos 
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keep using rainwater and Varillalito´s lagoon water, not just because of the lack of water but also 
their comprehension of the natural use of water, as this public servant says: 
 
“They have learned to live with nature (...) Families are rooted, there is already a 
feeling, it is a cosmopolitan place, there is a Belenino identity, there is a nostalgia 
for the land, the people do feel that they are Beleninos (...) The people settled in a 
river area a long time ago and [know how] to live with the water” (Public Servant, 
5). 
 
Thus, the water is not just considered as part of the local context of Bajo Belen, but as part 
of the Beleninos’ cultural practices. The understanding of the river water as natural and cultural 
relates to the second theme: natural pollution versus moral pollution. Civil servant relocation 
supporters interpret the resettlement project beyond the flooding problems. For this group, it is not 
just about Beleninos living in a dirty space, but having dirty practices and deviant culture. Thus, 
the project functions as a way to discipline their behaviors, as some public servants explain: 
 
“Families live in permanent contamination, without exaggerating, over garbage 
(…) That environment is unhealthy; the family overcrowding, it is their custom, it 
is their style, but that style, that form can modify (…) The families living in 
Varillalito have adapted (…) The goal is for all to leave (…) We consider that it is 
not a place for human beings to fully develop” (Public Servant, 4). 
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“When the river is higher, you see in the morning that [while] a child is washing 
his teeth, another one is going to the bathroom; everything with the same water (...) 
It is a different mentality from what we live here; they see it as normal (...) To 
change the adults’ mentality is going to be more difficult, but it easier with children 
(...) To improve the quality of life, we have to boost values” (Public Servant, 13). 
                      
For this group, the resettlement project includes guidance to a “moral self” and re-
socialization, sometimes through punitive and confrontational means. Fermín, one of the leaders 
in Varillalito, sheds light on this idea by explaining how in Varillalito, burglars, drunkards, and 
domestic and sexual aggressors are threatened with expulsion from the community. Thus, residents 
of Varillalito look to socialize Beleninos with healthy morals that do not replicate the way they 
used to live in Bajo Belen. In other words, they work towards the dissolution of a “vicious 
lifecycle” of dirtiness, poverty, disorder, and immorality. 
 
However, the level of sanitation and the quality of potable water in the resettlement area 
lead to the third theme of the selection of Varillalito. Civil servants against the project acknowledge 
the microbial contamination of Varillalito’s sandy soil. The land used to be a piggery, which 
explains the high amount of flies everywhere, and why the children, who usually go without shoes, 
have started exhibiting foot fungi. And although Varillalito has a water treatment plant that is 
supposed to distribute potable water, the water naturally contains higher amounts of iron, which 
makes it untreatable unless using a considerable amount of chlorine and makes the use of the 





“The president of the Republic had a [sense of] commitment to them [the 
Beleninos]. How are we going to do it? (…) Paternalism and a policy of social 
handouts (...) they [the government] ask for the first stone of anything to inaugurate, 
and then ask how do we implement this? A law (…) it needed to impose a law that 
authorized them to do something (...) Now we needed a piece of land (…) After all 
this, these technical and social processes, (…) we asked the leaders of the two main 
mafias of land invaders in Iquitos (...) We started the project with them (…) In San 
Juan, in a land they had already started to invade (...) There was already a process 
there. And we imposed the power of the central government’s authority over the 
regional and the local government for the occupation of that land (…) Then the 
water does not come, that is more than a problem, that is a shame for the Ministry 
of Housing (...) The problem is that the demand for that project is deficiently 
focused, poorly done (…) What are the water points, where does the water come 
from, the drain, the water from the piggeries, where the water goes, everybody 
knows that, they have done the project wrong (...) even if you do not believe it, it 
is water and sanitary management; these are technical problems (...) they have put 
too much chlorine [in the water] to distract from the other problems. It is a technical 
problem.” (Public Servant, 17). 
 
     Interestingly, while the public servants that support the project cite the inevitable flooding 
of Bajo Belen, the dirty practices and deviant culture of the Beleninos, and the safe conditions and 
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dignity that Varillalito provides, they also consider Bajo Belen a usable space after the Beleninos’ 
displacement. Some Public Servants mention the possibility of a tourist boulevard. 
 
 Finally, it is possible to identify two levels of power beyond the two groups of public 
servants—the medium tier leadership and the top leadership. The first represents the well-known 
conflict about the support and rejection of the project; they work hand-in-hand with the perceptions 
that Beleninos and ex-Beleninos have about the resettlement project. However, the top leadership 
represents interests behind the project that go further than flooding, pollution, and inhabitability: 
state-led development policies that only seek to fulfill a number of portfolio projects.  
 
 
Ex- Beleninos  
This group supports the resettlement project and the Ministry of Housing (MVCS), and 
believe that Varillalito will constitute the new city of Belen, a place of safety, cleanliness, order, 
development, and exemplary moral and religious values, as Fermín (42 years old) explains: 
 
“We live as a family; we cope with what will be in the future of this city (...) In 
Bajo Belen, customs are chaotic; crime, drug addiction, prostitution, and child 
trafficking, that should not cultivate here (...) We must direct them, tell them what 
they should not do (...) We proclaim how family life should be, how to guide 
children, with good manners. We have asked for help from the Ministry of Housing 
with psychologists for the mothers; the Ministry is giving us support (...) This city 
comes with all the services. This city is going to be an example for other towns; 
 
22 
water, drains, lights, a health center, a market, a police station, a school with all the 
tools, even a computer room. Everything we will have in the future is an essential 
benefit (...) [It is] a city with the highest manners, the envy of the city of Iquitos 
and other towns because we no longer cultivate what Bajo Belen is nowadays, a 
town of nobody (...) If yesterday we were thieves, here, we come to wash our 
consciences and our hands. Things don’t change overnight; it is a process, that is 
why we need Ministry support, to make people understand what they shouldn’t do 
(...) We organize as a family; people should behave well at home and in the street 
too. For example, if there is an abuser that beats his wife, we are going to punish 
him (...) Those people of Bajo Belen are not committed to development (…) Two 
people have already left because they were [caught] stealing chickens, clothes, in 
block 3. Your children are thieves, outside! The bars here in Varillalito are not 
forbidden, but they are not allowed to fight; however, there are some drunks…” 
 
In the words of ex-Beleninos, Bajo Belen is a dangerous, dirty, and chaotic place where 
there is no trust between people. For them, the choice to relocate is obvious, and without the power 
to challenge institutional values outside established normative channels, they see the government’s 
threats to make people move as justified (Castells, 2014). 
 
“Those who do not want to come here will have to go to another place because Bajo 




“The Navy is going to be in charge, people who do not want to leave Bajo Belen 
are going to be displaced with heavy machinery. Everyone who leaves must be here 
in Varillalito; nobody should be in Bajo Belen” (Ex-Beleninx, 7). 
 
The delays caused by the Beleninos’ resistance to the resettlement project only further their 
beliefs in the instability of the project and Varillalito’s lacking minimum conditions. Meanwhile, 
ex-Beleninos boast of their consistent light and water, the possibility of enlarging their houses, and 
the rich land for farming. 
 
Ex-Beleninos also talk about how Varillalito’s lagoon will function as a fishpond and 
tourist attraction in the future. At the same time, they complain about inefficient services and the 
absence of potable water and water in general. There ways to cope, however: 
 
“It’s been two weeks since the cistern came. Usually, we use tap water; there is a 
Ministry tank. First, the water came out gummy, now a lot of chlorine; my hair was 
very dry when showering. They say that now they are cleaning the tank, that’s why 
we don’t have any water. Sometimes a red car comes with treated water that sells 
it to us (…) In the Brook of Love [Varillalito’s brook], we can wash clothes, bathe, 
even boil water to drink” (Ex-Beleninx, 6). 
 
While ex-Beleninos praise their new space, they also often criticize it and remember Bajo 





Kelly (68 years old) moved to Varillalito about a year ago and is one of its wealthiest 
inhabitants. She lives in one of the households closest to the water treatment plant and is one of 
the few people in Varillalito that always has water. However, she prefers to use water from nature 
as she did in Bajo Belen. She uses rainwater and water from the brook to bathe, wash dishes, drink, 
and cook. However, she complains about the sandy soil: “This land is no good to farm. Also, I 
don’t know why my kids have wounds on their feet; I think the sand is dirty.” Indeed, the sand has 
fungus, which makes the land poor for farming and walking barefoot, a habit in Bajo Belen that 




The Belenino view of and approach to river level variations differs profoundly from that 
of the government. The group denies the concept of flooding as understood outside the Amazonian 
reality. Beleninos organize their perceptions of space in special practices, representations of space, 
and spaces of representation (Lefebvre, 1974). For this group, the changes in the river level are 
part of their everyday reality, their community and family habits, their shared knowledge of living 
with and in the river, and their history from the beginning of the development of Bajo Belen. Thus, 
their perceptions of risk and their decisions in regard to the resettlement project are oriented by 
principles of morality and solidarity (Dickert et al. 2012; Gusfield, 1986, 1968) and include their 
relationship with nature and their identity as a river community. It is not just a different 
understanding of risk and their economic means; it is also that the resettlement area does not 
provide their ideal climate and resources, making it dangerous for their survival. Therefore, they 
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have different attitudes towards what the government perceives as dangerous (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1986; Douglas, 1973). As some Beleninos explain: 
 
“There is no other argument… they enacted a law based on a study conducted by 
the Navy of Peru that says that this area will disappear; we have another report that 
says the contrary. Every year there is flooding, but that is natural, that does not 
mean that we are in danger or at risk. The government should improve the life 
quality of the population here, instead of wanting to get us out” (Beleninx, 2). 
 
“Because of the huaycos [mudslides/landslides]6, that’s why they have started 
talking about flooding. Here we have the creciente and vaciante [higher and lower 
river levels]. Here there is no risk; the only thing we have to do is be careful” 
(Beleninx, 8). 
 
Thus, government plans for relocation are based on an outsider understanding of risk, 
which excludes the Beleninos knowledge of nature’s behavior. Beleninos react to the proposed 
                                                
6 The term huayco is frequently used in Peru to describe landslides or avalanches of stones and mud that usually affect 
the city of Lima, located in the valleys of the Chillón, Rímac, and Lurín rivers, in the central coastal part of the country. 
This word has its roots in the Quechua language. It comes from the terms wayau (ravine) and lloclla (alluvium). 
During a huayco, a significant amount of land from the surrounding slopes falls off and drags water; it can also lead 
to strong debris flow, depending on the amount of sediment it brings. The huaycos tend to occur in streams where it 
rains continuously, or when torrential rains occur. Unlike huaycos, a flood is the occupation by water of areas that are 
usually free of this. River floods are natural processes that have occurred periodically and have been the cause of the 
formation of the plains in the valleys of rivers, fertile lands, fertile plains, and riverbanks. 
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resettlement plan based on a different understanding of what is dangerous for them. Therefore, this 
case provides a competing understanding of risk driving positions about displacement. 
 
 Belenino moral principles, which include constant interaction and dependence on 
solidarity, organize their cultural construction of risk as well as their relationship to space and 
social order (Douglas, 1970). While Beleninos are accustomed to living around the fluctuating 
river, they also search for physical security, economic security, and respect as “activities of 
dependency” within their community networks. To achieve these assurances, they participate in 
exchanges of solidarity (Auyero, 2015; Gusfield, 1968) regarding their survival strategies such as 
sharing food, work, transportation, and childcare. The relationships that Beleninos build around 
their survival strategies constitute contractual relationships with other members of the community. 
Thus, they refuse to be relocated not only because they do not see the risk that the government 
emphasizes, but also for the sake of their livelihood. The river is seen as a risk by the government 
but as a resource by locals. Therefore, in their opinion, the resettlement project acts against their 
culture as well as their social and economic development, as two inhabitants of Bajo Belen say: 
 
“These are attempts against the fundamental rights of the person, and against the 
economy of thousands of families in Bajo Belen (...) The government wants to 
relocate us where there is no development. Here are our customs, our culture, our 
work. The majority of people work in markets, ports, rivers, and others work in 
farms in nearby areas (…) Where the government intends to relocate us is about 20 
kilometers away from our space; if we only talk about daily transportation cost, we 
would be spending between 10 and 15 soles per day [3.25-5 dollars]. Families that 
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live here make a daily income of 20, 25 soles [6.25-7.5 dollars]; families survive 
with that” (Beleninx, 2). 
 
“We know how we live; we know how to live (...) They want to take us to a place 
where there is nothing; if they are going to do something, they should do it 100%. 
They say that they will put in a mini-market. How will a poor person buy there? 
That land has nothing. It’s a lie (...). They do not have water; they do not have 
sewage; it’s a lie. They are deceiving people (...) Enacting a law against a 
population in a habitable place… how is Belen uninhabitable? So I’m an animal? I 
am a Belenino. I was born here; my father and my mother raised me here” 
(Beleninx, 3). 
 
For this group, Bajo Belen represents certainty about their use of space and both its social 
and economic resources. Beleninos mention how living in Bajo Belen allows them to have socially 
and economically open development. They appreciate the proximity of primary and secondary 
schools for their children as well as access to different jobs. This group also values the possibility 
of building their own dwellings for their usual extended families of six to nine members per 
household in addition to having potable water, river water, and light. They believe that in Bajo 
Belen, even living in extreme poverty, they will never suffer from hunger or lack of income. 
 
On the contrary, their perceptions about the resettlement area represent insecurity about 
primary resources. For them, Varillalito, is an undeveloped area with precarious living conditions, 
inadequate schools, a higher cost of living, insufficient government housing considering the 
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average size of a Belenino family, and no potable water or light. The group considers Varillalito 
an inappropriate residential space because of the lack of minimum survival conditions, as this 
Belenino comments: 
 
“It makes me sad how these people are living… they are doing their bodily 
functions like cats. They have to walk 15 minutes to the brook to wash their clothes, 
and they don’t have any water” (Beleninx, 9). 
 
Even though Beleninos claim to respect ex-Beleninos’ decisions to “look for a better place 
for living,” they threaten them with the prevention of their return to Belen if they decide to leave 
Varillalito. They also interrogate the resettlement project’s aim. They say that if the government 
wanted to improve the living conditions of Beleninos, it would have invested in enhancing Bajo 
Belen, or at least have presented a finished project with all the necessary facilities before making 
people move. Furthermore, for Beleninos, coercion represents the central problem of the 
arguments for moving out of Bajo Belen. The threats they receive contradict the freedom to decide 
as outlined in the resettlement project, as these Beleninos explain: 
      
“The government looks for the humblest families and tells them that if they do not 
accept the relocation, they will not have access to light, water, school, or the health 
center; would you stay in those conditions? And then, they sign; that’s the strategy 
they’re using (…) Nowhere in the law says that the resettlement is mandatory, but 
the government uses the argument that the Navy is going to come with a truck 
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which is going to take your little house away; that’s why some people left” 
(Beleninx, 3) 
 
“To cover up that bad project [Belen Sostenible], overnight they present this new 
project, and in two months they approve it (...) They have made people sign, from 
the most incautious families to the humblest families, lying to them” (Beleninx, 2). 
 
On the other hand, even though they recognize their social and economic advantages in 
Bajo Belen, and are certain in their decision to stay, they also share a sentiment of uncertainty as 
well as hope for Bajo Belen’s future. Beleninos recognize the government’s power and 
acknowledge their vulnerability. A recurrent idea expressed in interviews and informal 
conversations is an unwillingness to leave along with a sense of resignation, as one Belenina 
exclaims: “The only way they can take me out of here is if I am dead.” The group hopes for the 
resettlement law’s repeal and for the government’s investment in Bajo Belen, a space with lower 
risks that they will keep defending. 
 
“Ten of my neighbors have returned from Varillalito; they say they have no home 
there, only land, that they don’t have built houses, and that those that are built are 
very small. I saw! (…) here [Bajo Belen] people work to get ahead; it is a lie that 
we cook with this water. We don´t know what will happen to the people who stay. 
I was born here, I know the people will rise up and protest here… even though I’m 




Failure and State-Led Projects After-Effect  
Besides the case of Bajo Belen, this research teaches us about development projects that 
fail to achieve their aims because they are based on an inaccurate construction of social reality and 
an economic standpoint. It also provides some insight for social scientists on how to theoretically 
and methodologically research state-led development projects.  
 
This study demonstrates how standardization works as a central problem in state-led 
development policies. I understand standardization as the creation of variables to measure a social 
reality. These variables work as tools to design, calculate, and monitor a public policy and its 
progress. As Scott mentioned (1998), the organization of the natural world is no exception, as in 
this study case. The government’s risk assessment is the reorganization and simplification of 
nature to suit developers’ and public and private institutions’ goals. 
 
Therefore, regarding the after-effect of policies, it is important to consider, following 
Lefebvre (1974), that any social reality within a specific space includes a dialectic interaction 
between that space and its society for its production and reproduction. Therefore, as in the case of 
public policies applied to a natural environment, it is indispensable to understand the everyday 
reality, for instance, the flow of people, daily practices, and ordinary objects that shape the space’s 
meaning, rather than simply rationalizing and standardizing a certain reality into a more convenient 
format for monitoring. Rationalization and standardization ignore the main features of the already 
functioning social order and exclude the local know-how as the basis for the design of  public 
policies. Therefore, this study, as well as those taught by Ferguson (1994), Hetherington (2011), 
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Scott, (1998), Pierce (2006), Babb (2001), and Mitchell (2009), teaches that standardized public 
policy designs are destined to fail.  
 
These types of designs result from a market-driven standardization as well as from a state 
that does not have a rationalized bureaucratic system, but the legitimacy to exercise power over 
dependent citizens (Waldman, 1995:431. In Imbush, 2003). However, even without a homogenous 
bureaucracy, state-led policies can function as a repressive action directed at a community based 
on their current potential participation in disagreements (Earl, 2011) as in the case of the two sets 
of literature presented at the beginning of this study. In the end, forced displacement may be not 
just a failed public policy but the result of contentious politics and the cause of perceived risk 
versus its result (Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto, 2008). As in the case presented in this study, state-
led development policies from western/ethnocentric approaches can create a conflict that in a 
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